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In a previous study (Paul & Pourtois, 2017), we found that positive mood substantially influenced the 
neural processing of reward, mostly by altering expectations and creating an optimistic bias. Under 
positive mood, the Reward Positivity (RewP) component and fronto-medial theta activity (FMθ) in 
response to monetary feedback were both changed compared to neutral mood. Nevertheless, 
whether positive valence per se or motivational intensity drove these neurophysiological effects 
remained unclear. To address this question, we combined a mindset manipulation with an imagery 
procedure to create and maintain three different affective states using a between-subjects design: a 
neutral mood, and positive mood with either high or low motivational intensity. After mood 
induction, 161 participants performed a simple gambling task while 64-channel EEG was recorded. 
FMθ activity results showed that irrespective of motivational intensity, positive compared to neutral 
mood altered reward expectancy. By comparison, RewP was not affected by positive mood nor 
motivational intensity. These results suggest that positive mood, rather than motivational intensity, 
is likely driving the change in reward expectation during gambling, which could reflect the presence 
of an optimistic bias. Moreover, at the methodological level, they confirm that the RewP ERP 




Reward processing is a cardinal component of reinforcement learning. More specifically, 
predictions about future successes are initially formed, and subsequent deviations between the 
actual outcome and its prediction are swiftly detected with the aim to adjust behaviour accordingly 
(Fiorillo, Tobler, & Schultz, 2003; Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Sutton & Barto, 1998). However, this 
fundamental process is not encapsulated, but liable to changes in the environment, including the 
motivational and affective state of the participant (Nusslock & Alloy, 2017; Umemoto & Holroyd, 
2017). In agreement with this view, in a recent electroencephalography (EEG) study (Paul & Pourtois, 
2017), we found that under positive mood, reward sensitivity and expectancy during gambling were 
increased compared to neutral mood. 
Although these first neurophysiological results were intriguing and lent support to the notion 
of a mood-congruency effect during reward processing (Eldar, Rutledge, Dolan, & Niv, 2016; 
Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003), an important unanswered question remained. More specifically, 
whether positive mood per se, or alternatively (approach) motivational intensity drove these effects, 
remained unclear. Positive mood is a heterogeneous construct, subsuming states ranging from 
contentment to amusement, which all have different adaptive functions that could presumably lead 
to different effects on reward processing (Shiota et al., 2014). Moreover, a key non-orthogonal 
dimension of positive mood is motivational intensity, particularly of approach motivation. Approach 
motivational intensity has been defined as the strength of the urge to go towards incentives, events, 
or situations (E. Harmon-Jones, Harmon-Jones, & Price, 2013). In this framework, positive emotions 
such as desire and determination are associated with high approach motivational intensity (or pre-
goal positive affect), whereas satisfaction and amusement are associated with low approach 
motivational intensity (or post-goal positive affect). Earlier studies found that high and low approach 
motivated positive affect had different effects on information processing, including the narrowing-
broadening effect of visuo-spatial attention (for a review, see Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2010; E. 
Harmon-Jones, Gable, & Price, 2013). Because positive affect and approach motivation are often 
confounded (in nature and in experiments), it was therefore unsettled based on our previous study 
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(Paul & Pourtois, 2017) whether positive mood per se, or instead approach motivation, actually 
drove the modulation of reward processing seen at the EEG level.  
Reward processing has been studied extensively in the past using EEG, and in particular, the 
event related brain potentials (ERPs) method. The most frequently studied ERP component is the 
Reward-Positivity (RewP), peaking at fronto-central electrodes around 250 ms after evaluative 
feedback onset. The RewP is typically larger for positive compared to negative, and better than 
expected outcomes (Gheza, Paul, & Pourtois, 2018; Holroyd, Pakzad-Vaezi, & Krigolson, 2008; 
Proudfit, 2015). Given its neurophysiological characteristics, the RewP has been proposed as a valid 
marker of reward processing (Bress & Hajcak, 2013; Proudfit, 2015; Umemoto & Holroyd, 2017). 
Although informative, the ERP method has some inherent limitations (e.g., it is based on a standard 
averaging technique), and is blind to other neurophysiological effects, which can be revealed using 
an appropriate time-frequency decomposition of the EEG signal (Fell et al., 2004; Makeig et al., 
2002). Among them, fronto-medial theta activity (4 – 8 Hz, FMθ) has been put forward recently as a 
valid neurophysiological marker of the need for cognitive control (Cavanagh, Figueroa, Cohen, & 
Frank, 2012; Hajihosseini & Holroyd, 2013; Hauser et al., 2014; Mas-Herrero & Marco-Pallarés, 2014). 
FMθ activity increases for response errors, conflicts, novel stimuli, and importantly for outcomes that 
turned out to be worse or better than expected, i.e. when reward is expected but omitted, or 
conversely, when reward is not predicted but well delivered (Gheza, De Raedt, Baeken, & Pourtois, 
2018; Paul & Pourtois, 2017).  
Capitalizing on these complementing electrophysiological correlates of reward processing, we 
found in our previous EEG study (Paul & Pourtois, 2017) that positive mood was accompanied by a 
blunted FMθ activity for reward feedback, when this reward was unexpected. Whereas participants 
in the neutral mood showed a larger FMθ response for unexpected compared to expected outcomes 
(irrespective of their valence), participants in positive mood showed this effect for the no-reward 
feedback only, as if these participants treated unexpected reward as expected (Mayer, Gaschke, 
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Braverman, & Evans, 1992; Sharot, Korn, & Dolan, 2011; Wright & Bower, 1992). Additionally, 
positive mood was accompanied by an increased RewP, which was in line with previous EEG studies 
showing an increased RewP for traits associated with positive affect, including extraversion (Cooper, 
Duke, Pickering, & Smillie, 2014; Smillie, Cooper, & Pickering, 2011) and reward sensitivity (Bress & 
Hajcak, 2013; Cooper et al., 2014; Umemoto & Holroyd, 2017).  
However, other EEG studies have linked increases in the amplitude of the RewP with 
approach motivation, rather than (positive) mood. For example, Angus, Kemkes, Schutter, and 
Harmon-Jones (2015) reported an increased RewP after the induction of anger, which is 
corresponding to a negative affective state characterized by enhanced approach motivation (Carver 
& Harmon-Jones, 2009; E. Harmon-Jones, 2007; E. Harmon-Jones, Harmon-Jones, Abramson, & 
Peterson, 2009). These authors suggested that the RewP component is not modulated by affective 
valence, but rather motivational direction/intensity. Conceptually similar research has revealed that 
trait anger also relates to an increased RewP (Tsypes, Angus, Martin, Kemkes, & Harmon-Jones, 
2019). The idea that approach motivation influences RewP is also supported by other EEG studies 
showing an increased RewP in trials where approach motivation was induced by the prospect of 
getting monetary reward in these trials (Threadgill & Gable, 2016, 2018) or increasing reward 
magnitude (Paul et al., in press). Accordingly, it seems plausible to assume that approach motivation 
rather than positive mood might have caused the change in the RewP, as well as FMθ, seen in our 
previous EEG study (Paul & Pourtois, 2017).  
To test this hypothesis, we devised a between-subjects design suited to disentangle effects of 
approach motivation from positive mood on reward processing. Using previously validated scripts 
and an imagery procedure (E. Harmon-Jones, Harmon-Jones, Fearn, Sigelman, & Johnson, 2008; Paul, 
Vassena, Severo, & Pourtois, 2019; Vanlessen, Rossi, De Raedt, & Pourtois, 2013), either a neutral 
mood, positive mood with low approach motivation, or positive mood with high approach motivation 
was induced. This was combined with a gambling task (Moser, Hajcak, & Simons, 2005) to extract the 
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RewP and FMθ activity at the feedback level. Subjective reports (see Paul & Pourtois, 2017), as well 
as frontal alpha-asymmetry (Coan & Allen, 2004; E. Harmon-Jones & Gable, 2018; Smith, Reznik, 
Stewart, & Allen, 2016) served as main manipulation checks to corroborate the presence of 
differential affective states elicited in these three groups. We compared two hypotheses. If positive 
mood accounted for the changes in reward processing seen previously at the EEG level (Paul & 
Pourtois, 2017), then we surmised that a larger RewP and blunted FMθ activity for unexpected 
reward should be observed for both conditions with positive mood (regardless of motivational 
intensity) compared to neutral mood in the current study. In comparison, if approach motivation 
mostly explained these changes, then we expected that a larger RewP and blunted FMθ activity for 
unexpected reward should be most visible for the high compared to the low approach motivation 
condition, without any similar effect seen in the neutral mood group.  
Methods 
Participants 
Sample size was based on our previous results (Paul & Pourtois, 2017), where we found a 
large effect of positive mood on FMθ (ηp² = 0.16, 90% CI [0.06  0.27]) and a sensitivity analysis 
carried out in G*power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). In order to detect a medium sized 
effect (ηp² = 0.06, i.e. the lower bound of the previous effect size), with a power (1-β) of 0.80, the 
current between-subjects design required a sample of 159 subjects. Data collection was carried out 
at two locations but with the same experimental setup and main researcher1. Ninety-nine students of 
The University of New South Wales (UNSW) were compensated with course credits and received an 
AU$15 “bonus”. This part of the study was approved by the UNSW Human Research Ethics Advisory 
Panel C: Psychology. Seventy-four participants were tested at Ghent University and compensated 
with €20 and a bonus of €10. This part of the study was approved by the ethical committee of the 
                                                          
1 A Table with the descriptive statistics of these two groups of participants can be found in the 
supplementary material, see Supplementary table 1. 
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Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences at Ghent University. All participants were right 
handed, provided written informed consent before the start of the experiment, and were randomly 
assigned to one of three mood conditions. 
One participant did not complete the experiment as she felt nauseous; one participant had to 
be excluded due to technical problems during data acquisition or noisy data; and four other 
participants had to be excluded due to poor performance (i.e., less than 60 % correct responses, see 
catch trials below). Additionally, six participants were excluded as their happiness or desire ratings 
deviated more than 2.5 SD from the group mean. Following these exclusions, 54 participants were 
included in the neutral mood condition, 54 participants in the low approach positive mood condition, 
and 53 in the high approach positive mood condition. The three groups were balanced for age and 
gender (MNeutral = 21.46 years, SD = 3.61, 34 females, MLow approach positive= 21.63 years, SD = 3.62, 34 
females, MHigh approach positive= 22.49 years, SD = 4.74, 27 females2).  
Mood Induction Procedure 
To change the mood state of the participants, we used a between-subjects design and 
combined two previously validated experimental procedures. A mindset manipulation (E. Harmon-
Jones et al., 2008) was combined with an imagery procedure (Bakic, Jepma, De Raedt, & Pourtois, 
2014; Paul & Pourtois, 2017; Vanlessen et al., 2013). Further, affect congruent music was played 
during the mood induction procedure and the rest of the experiment. The music pieces were 
selected from an online data base (https://www.melodyloops.com/). More specifically “the 
numbers” was played for the neutral mood, the “autumn song” was used for the low approach 
positive mood and the “world of heroic adventures” for the high approach positive mood. During the 
mindset-manipulation, participants had to choose an appropriate personal experience and to 
describe (by typing) the situation for five minutes. They were encouraged to describe the situation in 
as many details as possible. In the neutral mood condition, participants were instructed to describe 
                                                          




an ordinary day in their life, in which no positive or negative event occurred. In the low approach 
positive mood condition, participants were instructed to recall a situation that made them feel very 
good about themselves. Instructions emphasized it should be an event that happened to them and 
did not result from something they did. In comparison, in the high approach positive mood condition, 
participants were instructed to describe an intended project, that they would accomplish someday, 
and that they had already started to work on. They were told to describe the main steps involved in 
this project, and the feelings of achievement. These specific instructions have been used previously 
and found to be efficient to alter approach motivation (E. Harmon-Jones et al., 2008). Afterwards, 
during the imagery procedure, they were asked to close their eyes for three minutes and try to 
imagine themselves as vividly as possible in the situation they just described.  
Prior to the actual mood induction, the experimenter first trained all participants in 
multisensory imagery from their own perspective with a standard four-step exercise involving a 
lemon, i.e. holding, cutting and smelling it (Holmes, Coughtrey, & Connor, 2008; Holmes, Mathews, 
Dalgleish, & Mackintosh, 2006). More specifically, participants were asked to imagine that they were 
1) holding a lemon, 2) cutting it, 3) having a close look and smelling it, and 4) feeling a drop of the 
lemon juice in an eye. After this practice session, and independently of the experimenter, 
instructions were presented on the computer monitor. During this phase, the experimenter was not 
present and was therefore blind to the specific mood condition assigned.  
In order to maintain the effect of the mood induction throughout the experimental session, 
shorter repetitions of this mood induction were introduced twice, besides the use of a specific music 
excerpt played in the background (see above). These repetitions used the same instructions as the 
main mood induction procedure provided at the beginning of the experiment. Again, participants 
were asked to continue with their detailed description and to close their eyes (only for 90 seconds) to 




Subjective Ratings. We used subjective ratings provided at baseline and immediately after 
the mood induction to assess its effectivity. Six subscales of the Discrete Emotions Questionnaire 
(DEQ, C. Harmon-Jones, Bastian, & Harmon-Jones, 2016), namely happiness, desire, relaxation, 
anger, anxiety, and sadness, were used. Each of these subscales consisted of four items answered on 
a seven point scale. Additional items asking about arousal and determination were included too. The 
order of the items was alternated across participants and each measurement point. 
Frontal Alpha-Asymmetry. During the initial EEG resting state period (three minutes) as well 
as during the imagery within the subsequent mood induction sessions (lasting three minutes/90 
seconds each), alpha power at pre-defined frontal sites was extracted and analyzed. After 
preprocessing (see hereafter), recordings were manually inspected in order to remove segments 
containing artefacts before overlapping epochs were generated (length 2 seconds, overlap 1 second). 
On average, 299 (SD = 62.8) epochs were included for the longer recordings at the beginning of the 
experiment, and 159 (SD = 19.9) for the shorter recordings corresponding to repetitions of the mood 
induction. We computed the power spectral density by applying a fast Fourier transform on the task 
data (spectopo function), obtaining a dB converted estimation of relative power in a range of 
frequencies. Alpha power was defined as the average in the 8-13 Hz range. Asymmetry (difference) 
scores were computed as the natural log right - natural log left alpha power at F8/F7. Alpha power is 
inversely related to cortical activity (Cook, O’Hara, Uijtdehaage, Mandelkern, & Leuchter, 1998). 
Greater left frontal activity (hence, lower left alpha power) is associated with approach motivation, 
whereas greater right frontal activity is associated with avoidance motivation (Coan & Allen, 2004; E. 
Harmon-Jones & Gable, 2018). Therefore, higher scores on this asymmetry score indicate greater left 




A variant of a previously validated gambling task was used (Hajcak, Moser, Holroyd, & 
Simons, 2007; Paul & Pourtois, 2017), see Figure 1. On each trial, participants chose one of three 
doors by pressing with their right index finger a corresponding key on the keyboard. After a fixation 
dot (800 ms), this choice was followed by either reward feedback (green “+”), indicating a reward of 
$0.14/€0.10, or no-reward feedback (red “o”; 1000 ms). At the beginning of each trial, participants 
were informed about reward probability with a visual cue (1000 ms). The cue was presented in the 
form of a small circle filled to one or two thirds (black/white) indicating a reward probability of 33% 
or 66%. Feedback was only related to these objective reward probabilities and not the choices of the 
participants. All participants ended up with a preset winning of $15/€10.  
To ensure that participants paid attention to the cue informing about reward probability as 
well as the feedback, additional questions were occasionally asked and used as catch trials. On some 
trials (n=38), they were asked about the current reward probability just after they saw the visual cue 
(“How many doors do contain a prize?”), and they responded by pressing a number on the keyboard 
(either 1 or 2). On 38 different trials, they were asked how much they actually expected to receive 
this specific feedback, just after having received it, and they responded on a visual analog scale 
(anchored with “not at all” and “a lot”). On 12 other trials, they were asked both questions. All 
stimuli were shown against a grey background on a 23-inch LCD screen and the experiment was 




Figure 1. Overview of the trial structure. At the beginning of each trial, participants were 
informed about reward probability using a specific cue (33 or 66 %). After they chose one door, they 
received either monetary reward or no-reward feedback. Additionally, in some trials, participants 
had to report the current reward probability after the visual cue was shown and/or rate feedback 
expectations after receiving it. 
General Procedure 
Participants started with instructions and six practice trials, before they rated their current 
affective state using the Discrete Emotions Questionnaire (DEQ, C. Harmon-Jones, Bastian, & 
Harmon-Jones, 2016) and an EEG resting state with closed eyes was recorded for three minutes. 
These first measurements served as baseline mood ratings. Afterwards participants practiced their 
visual imagery abilities with the lemon exercise (Holmes et al., 2008), before they completed the 
mood induction procedure. The DEQ was administered again before participants continued with the 
gambling task. The task consisted of 210 trials in total (105 of small reward probability), and was 
presented in three blocks of 70 trials each. After each block, participants had a short break. During 
this break, they were informed about their current pay-off, before a shorter version of the mood 
induction was applied and the DEQ was repeated. At the end of the experiment participants filled in 
the English version of the BIS/BAS scales (Carver & White, 1994) and a life satisfaction questionnaire 
(Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985). Participants at Ghent University, also had to answer some 
additional questions regarding the feedback, see supplementary material. 
Recording and Preprocessing of Electrophysiological Data  
EEG was recorded using 64 electrodes positioned according to the 10-10 EEG system. 
Additional electrodes were placed on the mastoids and to measure eye movements, above and 
below the left eye (vertical eye movements) and the two canthi (horizontal eye movements). Signals 
were recorded using a BioSemi Active Two System (BioSemi, Amsterdam, The Netherlands) with 
ActiView software (version 7.06, BioSemi). EEG was sampled at 512 Hz and referenced online to the 
common mode sense (CMS) and passive driven right leg (DRL) electrodes. The EEG was preprocessed 
offline with EEGLAB 13.5.4b (Delorme & Makeig, 2004), implemented in Matlab R2013b, and 
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included a 0.03/35 Hz high/low pass filter and re-referencing to the mastoids. For data cleaning the 
Algorithmic Pre-Processing Line for EEG (APPLE, Cavanagh et al., 2017) was applied, which combines 
functions from the open source toolboxes FASTER (Nolan, Whelan, & Reilly, 2010) and EEGLAB with 
custom algorithms for automatically identifying the most likely independent component associated 
with eye blinks, interpolating bad channels, and removing bad epochs. The codes used for EEG data 
preprocessing can be found on https://osf.io/kc42t/. For identifying bad channels, EEGLAB and Faster 
marked activity exceeding a probability of 2.5 SD/z-scores (with a maximum of 5 electrodes). On 
average 3.89 (SD = 0.84) ICA components were removed and 4.10 (SD = 1.76) channels interpolated. 
Feedback related epochs were extracted from -1000 to 2700 ms centered around the 
feedback onset, and baseline corrected using the -250 to 0 ms interval before it. For each subject 
separately, the EEG data corresponding to the four main experimental conditions were extracted: 
Expected and unexpected feedback, corresponding to a probability of ⅓ = 33 % and ⅔ = 67 %, 
respectively, separately for reward and no-reward feedback. On average 5.75 % (SD = 3.01) of epochs 
were rejected using the FASTER algorithms that detect epochs deviating 2.5 z-scores from the mean 
data, variance and maximum amplitude. To account for different signal to noise ratios between 
conditions, a subset of trials of the more frequent expected conditions (M = 65.1, SD = 2.23, Range = 
55-69) was selected and used to match the smaller trial number available for the unexpected 
conditions (M = 33.5, SD = 0.73, Range = 31-35). This selection was carried out randomly for each 
individual subject. 
The RewP was quantified at Fz as the mean amplitude between 230 and 280 ms post 
feedback onset. This time window and electrode location were selected based on the maximum of 
the difference between no-reward and reward feedback across all conditions (i.e., 255 ms), and was 
identical to our previous studies (Gheza, Paul, et al., 2018; Paul & Pourtois, 2017; Paul et al., 2019). 
The time frequency analysis was done using EEGLAB built-in std_ersps function (2.4 to 21 cycles, 0.8 
to 35 Hz, 180 log-spaced frequencies, 300 time points per epoch). The -500 to -200 ms time interval 
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before feedback onset was used for baseline correction. FMθ activity (4 - 8 Hz) was defined as the 
mean within 200 – 400 ms at Fz. This electrode position was chosen based on the local maximum of 
the difference between no-reward and reward feedback for the mean voltage or mean power values 
obtained (see Figures 4E and 5B), and previous EEG studies using the same experimental procedure 
(Gheza, Paul, et al., 2018; Paul & Pourtois, 2017).  
Data Analysis 
For all analyses, the significance alpha cutoff was set to 0.05 (two-tailed). Data analysis was 
carried out in JASP (0.8.2., Jasp Team 2017) and post-hoc analyses were computed using SPSS (22, 
IBM statistics). Greenhouse-Geisser correction was performed when sphericity was violated. 
Moreover, ayesian statistics for the ANOVA were used with the recommended standard settings and 
priors. Materials, data and analysis scripts are publicly available on the Open Science Framework 
(https://osf.io/kc42t/). 
Manipulation Checks. A mixed model ANOVA with Mood (three groups: neutral, low 
approach positive, and high approach positive) as between-subjects factor and Time (four 
assessments: baseline and three manipulations) as within-subject factor was used, separately for 
each scale and the frontal alpha-asymmetry index. All post-hoc comparisons can be found in the 
Supplementary Table 3. 
Catch Trials. For reward probability (cue), accuracy data were computed. The raw data were 
first transformed into percentages of correct responses and compared between groups by means of 
a one-way ANOVA. For the feedback, expectedness ratings were first transformed into percentage, 
arbitrarily setting one anchor to 0 and the other one to 100. These accuracy data were analyzed 
using separate mixed-model ANOVAs with the within-subject factors feedback Valence (reward or 
no-reward) and feedback Expectancy (expected or unexpected), and the between-subjects factor 
Mood (neutral, low approach positive, or high approach positive). 
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EEG data. The amplitude of the RewP and FMθ activity were analyzed using separate mixed-
model ANOVAs with the within-subject factors feedback Valence (reward or no-reward) and 
feedback Expectancy (expected or unexpected), and the between-subjects factor Mood (neutral, low 
approach positive, high approach positive). 
Results 
Manipulation Checks 
Subjective Ratings. The ANOVA run on the data for the happiness subscale of the DEQ 
showed significant effects of Time, F(2.6, 408) = 7.83, p < .001, η² = .043, Mood, F(2,158) = 7.54, p = .001, 
η² = .087, and the interaction between them, F(5.2,408) = 8.31, p < .001, η² = .091. While the three 
mood conditions did not differ from each other at the baseline measurement (ps ≥ .99), participants 
in low approach positive mood reported more happiness for all successive assessments compared to 
participants in neutral mood (ps ≤ .001). The high approach positive mood group reported only 
marginally significant higher levels of happiness compared to the neutral group (ps = .055 - .095). The 
high approach positive mood group had slightly higher levels of happiness compared to the low 
approach positive mood condition (ps = .043 - .11), see Figure 2.  
The data for the relaxation subscale showed significant main effects of Time, F(2.6,407) = 4.86, 
p = .002, η² = .027, and Mood, F(2,158) = 9.09, p < .001, η² = .10, as well as a significant interaction 
between them, F(5.1,407) = 8.91, p < .001, η² = .10. In comparison to the baseline measurement, 
relaxation did not change over time for the neutral mood group (all ps > .99). However, participants 
in high approach positive mood reported feeling less relaxed after the first mood induction as well as 
all subsequent assessments (all ps ≤ .001). Participants in low approach positive mood reported 
slightly increased feelings of relaxation after the first mood induction compared to baseline (p = 
.014), but no other changes were significant (ps ≥ .15)  
The ANOVA run on the data for the desire subscale of the DEQ showed a significant 
interaction between Time and Mood, F(5,397) = 2.39, p = .037, η² = .029. Participants in high approach 
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positive mood reported (trend-significant) higher levels of desire compared to the neutral group 
after the first and second mood inductions (p = .032 and .055), while there was no difference 
between the groups for any other time point (ps ≥ .28). No other main effect was significant Fs ≤ 
2.03, p ≥ .13, η² ≤ .025. 
The ANOVA run on the data for the anxiety subscale of the DEQ revealed a significant effect 
of Time, F(2.3, 358) = 15.31, p < .001, η² = .084, Mood, F(2,158) = 3.74, p = .026, η² = .045, and a significant 
interaction between Time and Mood, F(4.5, 358) = 4.99, p < .001, η² = .055. In comparison to the 
baseline measurement, anxiety did not change over the course of the experiment for neutral and 
high approach positive moods (all ps ≥ .049). However, participants in low approach positive mood 
reported feeling less anxious after the first mood induction as well as all repetitions (all ps ≤ .001). 
For the sadness and anger subscales, no significant main or interaction effects were found, Fs ≤ 2.06, 
ps ≥ .11, η² ≤ .039.  
The ANOVA run on the data for the determination item showed a significant effect of Time, 
F(2.8,443) = 6.54, p < .001, η² = .036, Mood, F(2,149) = 8.53, p < .001, η² = .11, as well as a significant 
interaction between Time and Mood, F(5.5,443) = 6.39, p < .001, η² = .076. While determination did not 
differ between the three moods at baseline (ps ≥ .99), participants in high approach positive mood 
reported feeling more determined for all successive time points compared to the neutral and low 
approach moods (ps = .074 - .001). The ANOVA run on the arousal ratings did not show any 





Figure 2. Mean ratings of the manipulation check, including individual data points, error bars 
represent ±  2 SEM. Subjective ratings and frontal alpha asymmetry are shown separately for the 
neutral, low approach positive, and high approach positive moods as a function of time, including the 
baseline measurement (BL) and three repetitions of the mood induction (M1-M3). 
Frontal alpha-asymmetry. The ANOVA showed a significant effect of Time, F(1.9, 305) = 3.62, 
p = .029, η² = .022, as well as a significant interaction between Time and Mood, F(3.9, 305) = 2.59, 
p = .038, η² = .031. Post-hoc tests showed that neither the low approach positive mood nor the 
neutral mood showed a change in frontal alpha asymmetry across the different measurement points 
compared to the baseline measurement (all ps ≥ .99). By comparison, participants in high approach 
positive mood showed greater left relative to right frontal cortical activity after the first mood 





For reward probability (cue), accuracy was very high, with an average of 94.9 % (SD = 7.05) of 
correct responses. The three mood conditions did not differ on this metric, F(2,158) = 0.11, p = .89, 
η² = .001.  For the ratings of feedback’s expectedness, the ANOVA showed significant main effects of 
feedback Expectancy, F(1,158) = 102.94, p < .001, η² = .38, and feedback Valence, F(1,158) = 69.13, 
p < .001, η² = .30.  The interaction between Mood and Expectancy was also significant, F(2,158) = 5.31, 
p = .006, η² = .039. Expected feedback was rated to be more expected than unexpected feedback 
(p < .001), confirming the efficacy of the manipulation. Moreover, reward feedback was more 
expected than no-reward feedback (p < .001), indicating an expectancy bias towards reward 
feedback, see Figure 3. Although post-hoc tests were not significant, the interaction between Mood 
and Expectancy indicated that participants in high approach positive mood did expect unexpected 
feedback even less than the neutral group (p = .061). No other main effects or interactions were 
significant, Fs ≤ 1.77, ps ≥ .17, η²s ≤ .013. 
 
Figure 3. Mean ratings of feedback expectedness, including individual data points for each 
feedback condition and mood. Rhombs are centered on the mean; error bars represent ± 2 SEM.  
EEG data 
RewP. The ANOVA showed a significant main effect of feedback Valence, F(1,158) = 329, 
p ≤ .001, η² = .67, as well as a significant main effect of Expectancy,  F(1,158) = 8.22, p = .005, η² = .049. 
Reward feedback elicited a larger (more positive) RewP component compared to no-reward 
18 
 
feedback (p < .001), and unexpected compared to expected feedback (p < .001). No other effects 
reached the level of significance, Fs ≤ 1.35, p ≥ .26, η² ≤ .017, see Figure 4 and Table 1. To assess the 
evidence in favor of the null hypothesis (i.e. the lack of mood effect on the RewP), we ran a JZS Bayes 
factor repeated measurement ANOVA. As expected, the model including feedback Valence and 
Expectancy explained the data the best (BF10 = 1.02e+56), i.e. four times better than any model 
including Mood. The change from prior to posterior inclusion odds averaged across all candidate 
models, i.e. BFInclusion , showed clear support for the main effect of Valence (BFInclusion = 3.22e+15). Mild 
to anecdotal evidence was found against the main effect of Expectancy (BFInclusion= 0.54) and the 
interaction of both (BFInclusion= 0.23). Importantly, the odds for any model including the factor Mood 
were very low (BFInclusion= 0.091-0.008), indicating strong to very strong evidence for the null 
hypothesis, i.e. that mood did not influence the RewP. Similarly, when we only compared the two 
positive mood conditions, we found moderate to strong evidence for the null hypothesis, i.e. that 




Figure 4. RewP Results. RewP was quantified as the mean amplitude 230-280 ms after 
feedback onset (shaded area) at Fz. (A) Grand average ERPs plotted separately for reward and no-
reward feedback, as well as expected and unexpected one. (B) The difference between reward and 
no-reward FB in all three moods. (C) Mean RewP amplitudes, including individual data points for each 
feedback condition and mood. Rhombs are centered on the mean; error bars represent ± 2 SEM. (D) 
Topographical maps (horizontal view) of the difference between reward and no-reward feedback for 





Table 1.  
Means (Standard Deviations) of EEG components and Expectedness Ratings 
 
Mood  








FMθ activity      
 Neutral 2.65 (2.03) 3.03 (1.75) 1.71 (1.71) 2.17 (1.38) 
 Low Approach 2.96 (1.70) 3.51 (1.63) 2.42 (1.68) 2.56 (1.80) 
 High Approach 2.51 (1.21) 3.09 (1.43) 2.07 (1.46) 1.89 (1.23) 
RewP         
 Neutral 1.71 (5.66) 1.45 (6.53) 6.86 (7.60) 8.61 (6.75) 
 Low Approach 1.00 (7.37) 1.91 (6.98) 6.42 (7.50) 6.79 (8.30) 
 High Approach 2.36 (5.13) 3.00 (5.44) 7.75 (6.58) 8.50 (7.01) 
Expectedness  
        
 Neutral 52.5 (10.9) 43.0 (10.6) 59.5 (9.51) 52.9 (13.2) 
 Low Approach 50.0 (17.1) 40.3 (16.3) 61.9 (14.9) 52.6 (16.7) 
 High Approach 54.7 (15.2) 38.2 (13.5) 63.3 (12.3) 46.9 (16.1) 
 
FMθ. The ANOVA showed significant main effects of feedback Expectancy, F(1,158) = 17.6, 
p < .001, η² = .099, and feedback Valence , F(1,158) = 74.8, p < .001, η² = .32, as well as the interaction 
between them, F(1,158) = 5.27, p = .002, η² = .054. Importantly the three-way interaction between 
feedback Expectancy, Valence and Mood was also significant, F(2,158) = 4.26, p = .016, η² = .048. All 
mood conditions showed a stronger FMθ activity in response to no-reward compared to reward 
feedback (all ps ≤ .022). However, only participants in neutral mood showed more FMθ activity for 
unexpected reward compared to expected reward (p = .006). By comparison, neither low approach 
positive mood (p = .38), nor high approach positive mood (p = .17) actually showed increased FMθ 
activity for unexpected compared to expected feedback when this feedback was rewarding, while 
this was the case for no-reward feedback (neutral: p = .027, low approach positive mood: p = .001, 
high approach positive mood: p = .001), see Figure 5. No other main effects or interaction 
approached the level of significance, Fs ≤ 2.17, ps ≥ .12, η²s ≤ .027. We also ran a JZS Bayes factor 
repeated measurement ANOVA to compare the two positive mood groups directly, . As expected, the 
model including the interaction of Valence and Expectancy fitted the data the best (BF10 = 1.35e+14). 
The change from prior to posterior inclusion odds averaged across all candidate models, i.e. BFInclusion , 
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showed clear support for the main effect of Valence (BFInclusion = 1.72e+13) and Expectancy 
(BFInclusion = 45.7), and their interaction (BFInclusion = 33.6). Mild to anecdotal evidence was found 
against any effect of Mood (BFInclusion= 0.77 – 0.068), indicating that motivational intensity did not 
influence FMθ activity.  
 
Figure 5. FMθ activity results. FMθ activity was defined as the mean between 200-400 ms at 
electrode Fz. (A) Difference between unexpected and expected feedback, separately for reward and 
no-reward and each mood condition. (B) Topographical representation of the difference between 
reward and no-reward for each mood condition. (C) Mean FMθ activity, including individual data 
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points for each feedback condition and mood. Rhombs are centered on the mean; error bars 
represent ± 2 SEM. 
 
Discussion 
In a previous EEG study (Paul & Pourtois, 2017), we found specific changes during reward 
processing following the induction of positive mood. However, because positive mood and approach 
motivation can co-vary, it remained unclear what eventually drove these changes. To disentangle 
effects of positive mood from approach motivation on reward processing, we combined a gambling 
task (Hajcak, Holroyd, Moser, & Simons, 2005; Hajcak et al., 2007) with affective state manipulations, 
and measured reward processing at the EEG levels. Mood of participants was altered by means of a 
mindset manipulation combined with an imagery procedure to induce either neutral or positive 
mood. In addition, the positive mood induction was accompanied by either a low or high approach 
motivation induction. EEG results showed that under positive mood and irrespective of approach 
motivation intensity, FMθ activity did not differentiate if reward feedback was expected or not, while 
FMθ activity was clearly larger for unexpected compared to expected no-reward feedback. Because 
this effect was equally strong in both positive mood conditions (compared to a neutral mood control 
condition), and hence occurred irrespective of the approach motivation intensity, this result 
suggested that positive affect (but not approach motivation) likely changed reward expectation in a 
mood congruent way, thereby replicating and extending our previous results (Paul & Pourtois, 2017). 
In comparison, mood did not change the RewP. Below, we discuss the possible implications of these 
new findings for neurobiological models of reward processing in the existing literature. 
The mood induction procedure turned out to be successful as confirmed by both subjective 
ratings and frontal alpha asymmetry. By combining a mindset manipulation (E. Harmon-Jones et al., 
2008) with an imagery procedure (Bakic et al., 2014; Paul & Pourtois, 2017; Paul et al., 2019; 
Vanlessen et al., 2013), participants in the three mood groups differed from each other along both 
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positive mood and approach motivation intensity. More specifically, participants in both positive 
mood conditions (irrespective of approach motivation intensity) reported feeling happier at the 
subjective level, compared to participants in neutral mood. However and importantly, only 
participants in positive high approach mood reported feeling more determined (and less relaxed) 
than those included in the two other mood groups. Moreover, only these former participants 
showed higher left relative to right frontal activity after mood induction, corroborating the 
assumption that approach motivation was increased (Coan & Allen, 2004; E. Harmon-Jones, Gable, & 
Peterson, 2010; Smith et al., 2016). Therefore, we could compare reward processing when either 
positive mood or approach motivation was elicited, with the goal to assess whether they led to 
similar or dissociable effects. 
Replicating our previous results (Paul & Pourtois, 2017), we found that FMθ activity in both 
positive mood conditions (irrespective of approach motivation intensity) did not differentiate if 
reward feedback was unexpected or not, while it clearly did differentiate if no-reward feedback was 
unexpected or not. Tentatively, this neurophysiological effect could translate an optimistic bias in 
these two mood groups characterized by enhanced positive mood (Eldar et al., 2016; Loewenstein & 
Lerner, 2003; Wright & Bower, 1992). Moreover, when brought together with our previous EEG 
results (Paul & Pourtois, 2017), these new findings confirm that positive mood, but not approach 
motivation, was likely the underlying factor responsible for this specific change during reward 
processing. Positive mood can alter the processing of reward (positive) prediction error signals, 
which are instrumental to (de)code the degree of mismatch between the actual and expected 
outcome (Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Sambrook & Goslin, 2015; Schultz, 2015; Schultz, Dayan, & 
Montague, 1997; Ullsperger, Fischer, Nigbur, & Endrass, 2014; Walsh & Anderson, 2012). By 
comparison, approach motivation did not appear to produce distinctive changes in FMθ activity in 
our study. More generally, FMθ activity is thought to reflect cognitive control (Cavanagh, Eisenberg, 
Guitart-Masip, Huys, & Frank, 2013; Cavanagh & Frank, 2014; Cavanagh, Zambrano-Vazquez, & Allen, 
2012; Swart et al., 2018). Accordingly, it is conceivable that positive mood could loosen cognitive 
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control in a context specific manner (i.e., when reward is expected) rather than altering reward 
processing per se.   
This interpretation is also supported indirectly by the lack of systematic modulation of the 
RewP as a function of positive mood or approach motivation in our study. Although the amplitude of 
the RewP was clearly larger for reward compared to no-reward feedback (Holroyd et al., 2008; 
Sambrook & Goslin, 2015; Ullsperger, Danielmeier, & Jocham, 2014), this reward-sensitivity effect 
was similar for the three mood groups (as confirmed by a Bayesian analysis). Based on our previous 
study (Paul & Pourtois, 2017) and previous research on approach motivation and reward sensitivity 
(Angus et al., 2015; Bress & Hajcak, 2013; Cooper et al., 2014; Threadgill & Gable, 2016, 2018), we 
nonetheless expected that an increase in approach motivation and/or positive affect would lead to a 
larger RewP component. Tentatively, this discrepancy between these previous findings and the 
current results for the RewP could be explained by some methodological factors, including the way 
approach motivation was elicited, and hence its relation to reward processing. In these previous 
studies, approach motivation was usually contingent and task relevant, comparing monetary reward 
to conditions without this incentive (Threadgill & Gable, 2016, 2018), or comparing conditions 
varying in reward magnitude (Meadows, Gable, Lohse, & Miller, 2016; Paul et al., 2019). In 
comparison, in the current study, we capitalized on a mood induction procedure that was orthogonal 
to the gambling task and not coupled to reward. Thus, it may be the case that approach motivation 
could increase the RewP when it is directly task- and goal-relevant, but less able to do so when it is 
orthogonal to the (gambling) task, and hence, not immediately goal relevant. However, when being 
task-irrelevant, approach motivation can nonetheless lead to some behavioral effects, including 
preference judgements for in decision making (E. Harmon-Jones & Harmon-Jones, 2002; E. Harmon-
Jones et al., 2008), aggressive inclinations (E. Harmon-Jones & Peterson, 2008), and perceived control 
(Gollwitzer & Kinney, 1989). Accordingly, future studies are needed to determine the necessary 
conditions for a systematic modulation of the RewP, besides subjective ratings, as a function of 
approach motivation.  
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Because of this apparent difference between the RewP and FMθ activity in our study, these 
new results also add to a growing literature suggesting that these two neurophysiological 
components can capture dissociable effects during reward processing and are complementing one 
another, even though they probably share a common neurobiological ground (Cavanagh, Frank, 
Klein, & Allen, 2010; Cavanagh, Zambrano-Vazquez, et al., 2012; Cohen, Elger, & Ranganath, 2007). 
Whereas the RewP is mostly linked to the processing of signed reward prediction errors (i.e., when 
the outcome is better than expected), FMθ activity is usually larger for unsigned reward prediction 
errors (i.e., when the outcome is either worse or better than expected; Hajihosseini & Holroyd, 2013; 
Osinsky, Seeger, Mussel, & Hewig, 2016). Using this framework, our results therefore suggest that 
positive mood could decrease the expectancy of reward selectively (FMθ activity), while leaving 
reward sensitivity (RewP) unaffected. Importantly, we could show here that positive mood, rather 
than approach motivation, accounted for this change during reward processing. 
Last, a caveat warrants comment. We found that the subjective ratings for feedback’s 
expectedness did not perfectly align with FMθ results. We believe that this dissociation likely 
resulted from the way these ratings were administered. Since they were provided after but not 
before feedback processing, it is likely that they mostly captured objective reward probability rather 
than subjective expectancy (Windschitl, Smith, Rose, & Krizan, 2010). Feedback’s expectedness was 
not rated before feedback delivery, as we did not want to break the normal trial sequence (choosing 
a door followed by evaluative feedback). In this context, complex updating and integration processes 
between reward expectancy and reward consumption likely took place, making these ratings 
imperfect evaluations of reward expectancy. Accordingly, the question remains whether purer 
measures of reward expectancy at the subjective level might better align with FMθ activity than in 
the present case. 
To conclude, the present study informs about modulatory effects created by positive mood 
and approach motivation on reward processing. Results showed that the former but not the latter 
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variable influenced reward processing, by altering reward expectancy selectively, with an effect 
visible at the FMθ level. In comparison, reward sensitivity, as measured by the RewP, was not 
influenced by positive mood or approach motivation. We interpret these results in terms of 
optimistic bias unlocked by positive mood during gambling, whereby unexpected reward is no longer 
processed as surprising in this specific mood state. .More generally, these findings emphasize that 
reward-related brain processes are flexible, and shaped by the current affective and motivational 
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